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1.  Introduction 
On March 30
th 1867 the Russian Empire sold the Alaska-Territory for US-$ 7.2 
Million to the United States, in 2010 Hewlett-Packard acquired Palm, Inc. for 
approximately $1.2 billion and on July 11
th 2009 Real Madrid paid 80 Million 
Pound  Sterling  to  Manchester  United  for  the  Portuguese  world-class  football 
player Cristiano Ronaldo. All three examples have in common that a unique asset 
was sold to an interested buyer. In absence of comparisons the pricing appears to 
be arbitrary or randomly. In general, trade is creating a surplus by transferring an 
asset from the seller to the buyer, to whom it is of greater value. This surplus is 
shared between the buyer and the seller. Therefore the question arises who gets 
which fraction of the surplus? This question is usually avoided, see e.g. Gupta & 
Lebrun (1999), by using axiomatic methods, like the Nash bargaining solution, 
where  the  fractionizing  is  done  following  an  exogenous  coefficient  which 
expresses the degree of bargaining power (Nash, 1950). In contrast methods of 
non-cooperative game theory like the sub-game perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) fractionize  endogenously  but  usually  show  the  existence  of  a  first-mover-
advantage. In the ultimatum game (created by Güth et al., 1982) the first-mover 
advantage reaches its maximum. The offering party gets the whole surplus while 
the reacting party gets nothing. But this solution is obviously not transferable into 
reality.
1 Rubinstein (1982) sets up a model in which the buyer and the seller are 
alternately  making  offers  how  to  share  a  pie  of  size  1  until  an  agreement  is 
reached. It is shown that if time is valuable, i. e. both players  ,  consider an 
individual discount factor ﾠ ﾠЎ ,Ў , ﾠ the only sub-game perfect equilibrium is to 
reach  an  agreement  directly  with  the  first  offer.  Expressed  formally,  party  i 
gets ﾠ 1 − Ў  / 1 − Ў Ў  < 1.  
Subsequently, researchers have extended the model of Rubinstein in several ways. 
Admati & Perry (1987) are presenting a model where bargainers may wait with 
their response to an offer to signalize their relative strength. However, the parties 
might also postpone the response to an offer because they want to wait for new 
information and thus to resolve uncertainty regarding the value of the traded asset. 
Only recently, researchers have implemented such managerial flexibility rights by 
means  of  real  option  theory.  In  brief,  a  real  option  expresses  the  flexibility 
assigned to a decision, i.e. for example the decision to delay an investment or to 
abandon an investment project without being obliged to.
2 Betton & Moran (2003) 
use a real options approach to analyze the sale of a company. The bargaining is 
modeled as a non-cooperative game where the seller offers a price he is claiming 
for the company and the buyer can accept this price but is able to wait with his 
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1  Empirical research on the ultimatum game (for example Sutter et al., 2003; Rankin, 2003 or 
Wichardt et al., 2009) shows that the sub-game perfect solution is not the outcome in reality. 
2 For example Dixit & Pindyck (1994) or Trigeorgis (1996). decision to resolve some uncertainty about the value of the company. The results 
show  that  the  parties  reach  an  agreement  only  after  a  time  delay  which  is 
stochastic and that the selling party gets a higher percentage of the created surplus 
than the buying party.  
Our paper originates from Betton & Moran (2003) but differs in the fact that the 
total gain of the asset sale is known by both parties, that transferring the asset 
creates transaction costs for both parties and that the buyer can be the offering 
party, too. We show that in the absence of any interest-effect the bidding party 
gets the whole surplus generated by the trade of an asset. In line with Rubinstein’s 
(1982) findings, we demonstrate that an interest-effect impacts the first-mover 
advantage. Under uncertainty, however, managerial flexibility marginalizes the 
impact of the interest-effect. As is generally known the sale happens inefficiently 
late  after  sequential  bargaining  compared  to  the  results  of  the  cooperative 
bargaining framework (Nash, 1950). However, we can show that the preference 
between the two bargaining modes depends on the bargaining power. For some 
values of bargaining power the stronger party prefers sequential bargaining and 
the  weaker  party  prefers  cooperative  bargaining,  while  for  other  values  of 
bargaining  power  it  is  the  other  way  round.  Thus  a  range  of  values  for  the 
bargaining  power  exists  where  the  stronger  party  as  well  as  the  weaker  party 
prefers cooperative bargaining. 
 
	 ﾠ  2.  The Model 
Consider a person   (seller) who owns an asset that has at time   ﾠa value of   . For 
another  person     (buyer)  the  same  asset  has  a  higher  value  of 
     (  > 1). By selling the asset from   to   transaction costs of   arise for   as 
well as for  . We assume that the value of the asset is not constant over time but 
is following a geometric Brownian motion: 
     =         +            ﾠ,   0 =     (1) 
   
with   ≥ 0 ∈ ℝ  as the volatility of the asset value,   > 0 ∈ ℝ  as the growth 
rate of the asset value and   ( ) as an increment of a Wiener process with zero 
mean and variance equal to   . Finally, we assume that all agents are risk neutral 
and that the riskless interest rate ﾠ ﾠ , (  ≥  ) controls for the time-value of money. 
Upon selling the asset the seller gets the sales price    , (  > 0), has to pay the 
transaction cost of   and has to transfer the asset of value    to the buyer. He does 
not incur a loss, if ﾠ ﾠ  ≥ 1 + ﾠ     ﾠ. By buying the asset the buyer gets the asset 
with value     and in return has to pay     the sales price, and the transaction 
cost ﾠ . He does not incur a loss if  ﾠ  ﾠ ≤  ﾠ  − ﾠ     . Consequently, a sale of the 
asset from   to   will create a surplus if and only if    − 1    > 2 . The surplus 
is ﾠ   − 1    − 2  and its partitioning has to be negotiated by the choice of ﾠ . 
Therefore, at time  ﾠ   one party is offering a ﾠ  > 1 ﾠto the other party which can 
accept or reject the offer. The reacting party has not to decide immediately at time 
 ﾠ   of the offer whether it accepts or rejects the offer. Rather, it can postpone the 
decision. We assume that there is no possibility for further rounds of negotiation 
or for counteroffers. Hence, accepting the offer leads to a purchase of the asset. In 
addition, we will make the following generalizations. The party who places the bid  receives  upon  closing  the  deal        −    while  the  other  party,  i.e.  the 
reacting party, receives ﾠ      −  . We will assume that time is continuous, i.e. 
  ∈ [  ,∞). Thus the offering party has the action set ﾠ  ∈ 0,∞  and at every 
point in time the reacting party has the action set {accept, wait}.  
We rely on a Markovian Perfect Nash Equilibrium to determine the equilibrium 
strategy  for  both  parties.  In  particular,  the  party  that  places  the  bid  optimally 
defines   in stage one. Conditional on the offered premium   the reacting party 
will  choose  a  threshold  value   ∗     in  stage  two  at  which  the  offer  will  be 
accepted, which corresponds to an optimal timing decision with ﾠ ∗ =     ﾠ   ≥
  | ﾠ    >  ∗ . Hence, this degree of managerial flexibility can be interpreted as a 
real option. Exercising the option right refers to accepting the offer by acquiring 
the asset.
3  
Consequently, the value of the option to acquire the asset held by the reacting 
party is the solution of the following maximization problem in stage two: 
    = max    ﾠ         −        ﾠ ,  (2) 
 
where E[…] denotes the expectations operator. Solving equation (2) yields: 
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In contrast, the bidding firm will choose   in stage one such that it maximizes  
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3 We will assume that this managerial flexibility is not limited by a fixed maturity date. Therefore 
the possibility to accept the offer is a perpetual real option.     = max    ﾠ      ∗   −       ∗
 ﾠ ,  (5) 
subject to the other party’s reaction function, i.e.  ∗   . The solution of equation 
(3) leads to the following propositions. 
Proposition 1: The optimal demanded premium depends on whether the seller or 
the buyer of the asset places the bid. If the bid is placed by the seller then the 
optimal demanded premium results to: 
   =
   +   − 1
2  − 1
.  (6) 
If the buyer is the offering party then the optimal demanded premium results to:  
   =
   +   −  
2  − 1
.  (7) 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 2: The optimal timing threshold V∗ ﾠis independent of whether the 
buyer or seller is the reacting party and given by: 
 ∗ = ﾠ
 
  − 1  
2  − 1
  − 1
 .  (8) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
In  the  following,  we  will  give  an  answer  to  the  questions  what  surplus  is 
generated  by  the  sale  and  how  much  of  wealth  is  distributed  to  the  parties? 
Because the deal is closed at the same time the generated surplus yields:  





    
      
  
 
     
    
     
 
.  (9) 
However, depending on which party holds the bargaining power, this surplus is 
unevenly shared between the seller and the buyer. The expected profit of the party 
that holds the bargaining power (first mover, offering party) is  ﾠα G with a share of  the  surplus  of ﾠ ﾠα  = 2β − 1 3β − 2 .  Contrary,  the  fraction   ﾠα G  with 
α  = β − 1 3β − 2  is assigned to the second party. 
Proposition 3: The expected profit for being the offering party is greater than for 
being the accepting party, i.e. α  < α  ﾠ. This first-mover advantage is reduced by 
an  uncertainty-independent  interest  effect  and  reinforced  by  a  flexibility  effect 
which is increasing with uncertainty ( ﾠ∂α  ∂σ > 0 ﾠ). 
As Figure (1) depicts for   >   we have that    >   . The difference is due to a 
first-mover advantage. The extent of this advantage is affected by two factors, the 
size of interest and managerial flexibility respectively. While the impact of the 
latter on the first-mover advantage becomes the more pronounced the higher the 
uncertainty associated with the value of the asset the impact of the first factor is 
uncertainty-independent. The intuition behind this result is twofold. The net gain 
associated  with  the  exchange  of  the  asset  becomes  the  smaller  the  longer  the 
postponement regarding closing the deal. In particular, the greater the ratio  /  
becomes  the  stronger  the  decrease  of  the  net  gain.  Consequently,  the  reacting 
party holds some kind of bargaining power because he controls the exercise of the 
real option. Uncertainty, however, has a contrary impact on the net gain. Here, an 
increase  in  uncertainty  increases  the  net  gain  because  it  pays  to  wait,  i.e.  the 
offering party profits from the postponement. Hence, an increase in uncertainty 
diminishes the bargaining power the reacting party holds. As a result, the gain 
associated with the first-mover advantage increases.  Figure 1: The shares of the surplus of the offering party (  ) and of the non-offering party (  ) 
depending on the amount of uncertainty. 
 
As  uncertainty  becomes  infinitively  large,  the  uneven  distribution  of  profits 
reaches its maximum. Here, the offering party receives hundred percent of the 
value  generated  while  the  reacting  party  does  not  participate  from  the  gains 
generated,  i.e.     = 1 ﾠand ﾠ   = 0.  Without  an  interest  effect,  i.e.    =  ,  and 
without uncertainty, i.e.   = 0 ﾠ ﾠthe model is equal to the solution of the ultimatum 
game  with  sub-game  perfect  equilibrium.  The  sharing  rule  is  calculated 
by ﾠlim   →     = 1. Hence the ultimatum game can be seen as a special case of 
the presented model. 
Moreover,  the  results  raise  the  question  if  and  under  which  conditions  the 
distribution of the surplus between the parties will be shared equally. Under the 
assumption  that    >    it  is  easy  to  show  that     > 2/3  and  that  if  = 0 lim   →ʿ    = 2/3. Hence, the offering party will always get more than twice of 
the gain generated by the reacting party. 
Proposition  4:  In  a  cooperative  framework,  i.e.  the  parties  act  as  a  central 
planer, the optimal timing threshold is V   
∗ =
 
   
  
    . Therefore, the sale of the 
asset happens inefficiently late if it is determined sequentially by the two parties.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
As a consequence the generated surplus is lower than the optimal possible surplus 
(  <  ∗).  Figure  (2)  demonstrates  this  fact  and  furthermore  shows  that  the 
difference  ∗ −   increases with uncertainty. 
	 ﾠ
Figure 2: The generated surplus   (red) after sequential bargaining and 
the optimal generated surplus  ∗ (green) after cooperative bargaining, 
both depending on the amount of uncertainty. The variables are chosen 
as follows:   = 0.05,   = 0.1,    = 1,   = 1,   = 2.  
 Given a framework where both parties act cooperatively as a central planer the 
surplus  is  shared  between  the  two  parties  in  dependence  of  the  exogenous 
bargaining power   . Party 1 gets     ∗ and party 2 gets    ∗, with    ≔ 1 −   . 
Figure (3) compares the gains of the two parties in the cooperative framework in 
dependence of    with the gains in the sequential framework. If the bargaining 
power of the stronger party (which would be the first mover in the sequential 
framework) is only a bit higher than the other party’s bargaining power (Region I) 
the  stronger  party  would  gain  more  in  the  sequential  framework  than  in  the 
cooperative  framework,  while  the  weaker  party  would  gain  more  in  the 
cooperative framework. If in contrast the stronger party has almost the whole 
bargaining power (Region III) it would gain more in the cooperative framework 
than in the sequential framework, while the weaker party would gain more in the 
sequential framework. For a small range (Region II) of values of the bargaining 
power    the stronger party as well as the weaker party will gain more in the 
cooperative framework than in the sequential framework. 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of the gains of the two parties in the sequential and in 
the cooperative framework. 3.  Conclusion 
In  general,  asset  sales  raise  the  question  how  the  generated  surplus  is  shared 
among  the  parties.  In  a  sequential  framework  a  first-mover  advantage  usually 
prevails. In this paper, we demonstrate the impact of managerial flexibility on the 
first-mover advantage in a sequential game under uncertainty. The findings reveal 
that the first-mover advantage is reduced by an uncertainty-independent interest 
effect and reinforced by a flexibility effect that is increasing with uncertainty. 
Additionally we compare the results of sequential bargaining with the results of 
cooperative  bargaining  and  show  that  their  prevalence  is  dependent  on  the 
bargaining power of the negotiating parties.  
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 ﾠ  A. Appendix 
The  offering  party  chooses ﾠψ ∈ 0,∞   to  maximize ﾠ c ψ V∗ ψ − A
  
 ∗  
 
 
while the reacting party is maximizing Ω ψ V t
 
by choosing the threshold 
V∗ ψ  contingent on ψ. Here ﾠΩ is given by the following system of equations 
which represents the value-matching and smooth-pasting condition:
4	 ﾠ 
Ω ψ V∗ ψ
 
= a ψ V∗ ψ − A
βΩ ψ V∗ ψ
   
= a ψ
.  (A.1) 
 
For the offering party we get: 
max



























− 1 a′ ψ β. 
 
(A.3) 
If the seller is the offering party, we have that  ﾠ     =   −    and ﾠ     =
   − 1 ﾠ ﾠresulting ﾠto     =
      
      ﾠand  ﾠ ﾠ   
∗ =
 
     
    
     .  If  the  buyer  is  the 
offering  party  then  we  have ﾠ     =    − 1  and  c    =   −   .Hence,
we ﾠget ﾠ    =
      
      ﾠand   
∗ =
 
     
    
     . 
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4 Dixit & Pindyck (1994, p. 141). The timing decision of the central planer is equivalent to the optimal exercise of a 
perpetual call option, i.e. V   
∗ =
 
   
  
    . 5 Upon rearranging we get: 
V   
∗ =
 
  − 1
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  − 1
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  2  − 2
  − 1   <
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5 Dixit & Pindyck (1994, p. 142).  Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg
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